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Abstract
This paper examines a global games model of speculative attacks in which spec-
ulators can choose to attack any one of a number of targets. In the canonical global
games model with a single target, it is well known that there exists a unique equilib-
rium that survives the iterative deletion of dominated strategies, characterized by
the threshold values of the private signal and the fundamentals. This paper shows
that with two targets, iterative deletion of dominated strategies yields a unique
combination of threshold signal functions that are nondecreasing in the private sig-
nals of the other target’s fundamentals, and threshold fundamentals functions that
are increasing in the other target’s fundamentals. The result is shown to extend
to environments with any N symmetric targets. The key argument is to combine
the iterative deletion procedure with the contraction mapping theorem. The pa-
per then goes through a number of numerical examples and shows, among other
results, that more accurate private signals have a decoupling eﬀect on the outcomes
of attack on diﬀerent countries. Finally, this paper introduces public information
and shows that the suﬃcient condition for unique equilibrium threshold functions
is very similar to that for a unique equilibrium in the single-target model.
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11 Introduction
Global games of regime change are “coordination games of incomplete information in
which a status quo is abandoned once a suﬃciently large fraction of agents attack it”
(Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007)). In a typical setup, agents receive a noisy private
signal of the fundamentals, which represents the strength of the regime, or the status
quo. The agents then individually decide whether or not to attack, or more generally
take an action against, the regime, and when the fraction of agents attacking exceeds a
certain threshold that depends on the fundamentals, the attack succeeds and the regime is
abandoned. Since the seminal work of Morris and Shin (1998), which applied such games
to analyze speculative attacks against a currency peg, these games have been actively
applied to model a wide range of crisis situations.
This paper extends the literature on global games of regime change by allowing for
multiple regimes, or targets, that agents can choose to attack. Such a situation may
arise in a number of real-life environments. In the context of currency crises, speculators
may face multiple emerging countries with currency pegs, and choose from among these
currencies to allocate their limited resources for attack, such as wealth and informational
capacity. For example, during the Asian crisis of 1997-98, there were a number of
Asian currencies largely pegged to the U.S. dollar that came under speculative attack.
Similar scenarios apply to sovereign debt crises, including the recent European sovereign
debt crisis, in which the debt and credit default swaps of several countries, rumored to
be facing potential default, have been subject to speculative trading. Other possible
applications include a situation in which investors decide which project to invest in, or
rioters choose which government facility to attack, where the success of investment or
attack requires participation of at least a certain mass of agents.1 So, while this paper
places the discussion in the context of currency crises, its implications extend to a much
broader context.
In the canonical global games model with a single target, it is well known (see,
e.g., Morris and Shin (1998)) that iterative deletion of (strictly) dominated strategies
yields a unique equilibrium2 characterized by a threshold value of the private signal that
determines whether an agent participates in an attack, and by a threshold value of the
fundamentals that determines whether the regime is abandoned. This paper shows that
with two targets, with potentially diﬀerent precision of signals and cost of attack, iterative
1The global games approach is used to analyze investment in projects in Dasgupta (2007), and political
riots in Atkeson (2000), although in an environment with a single project or target of attack.
2Multiple equilibria may arise, however, when there is public information of the fundamentals, ei-
ther exogenous (Hellwig (2002)) or endogenous (Angeletos and Werning (2006), Hellwig, Mukherji, and
Tsyvinski (2006)) that is suﬃciently precise.
2deletion of strictly dominated strategies results in a unique combination of equilibrium
threshold signal functions and threshold fundamentals functions. As a consequence, the
equilibrium is unique up to ties, and the outcomes of attack are uniquely determined given
the fundamentals. The present paper then shows that the result extends to environments
with any N symmetric countries.
The basic argument behind these results is as follows. By extending the iterative
deletion procedure to the multiple target environment, one can deﬁne an operator on an
adequate space of functions. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium thresh-
old functions then follows by showing that this operator is a contraction, and by then
invoking the contraction mapping theorem. The resulting threshold signal functions are
nondecreasing in the private signals of other targets’ fundamentals, whereas threshold
fundamentals functions are increasing3 in the fundamentals of other targets.
While the equilibrium threshold functions cannot be obtained in closed form, they can
be computed through a relatively simple numerical algorithm, thanks to the contraction
property. In order to explore further properties of these functions and the associated
outcomes of attack, this paper explores, mainly focusing on the two-country case, several
numerical examples, and obtains several interesting results. First, with multiple targets,
a target’s sustainability depends crucially on the fundamentals of the other target, and not
simply on its own fundamentals; a target’s fundamentals are evaluated relative to those of
the other target. Second, the presence of a second target makes the survival of a target
more likely, if the total measure of speculators is ﬁxed; if the measure of speculators
doubles as does the number of targets, however, the region of fundamentals in which
both countries sustain the peg becomes smaller than when the two countries separately
face the speculative attack. Third, an increased precision of speculators’ private signals
has a decoupling eﬀect; since more accurate signals allow speculators to better discern the
country with the weaker fundamentals and to concentrate their attack on it, two countries
are more likely to face diﬀerent outcomes of attack.
Finally, this paper examines an extension of introducing exogenous public information.
The suﬃcient condition for unique equilibrium threshold functions, which guarantees that
the relevant operator is a contraction, is expressed in terms of the relative precision of
public and private information, and closely resembles the known suﬃcient condition for
equilibrium uniqueness in the standard model with a single target. In view of this ﬁnding,
this paper relates its contraction argument to the standard proof of equilibrium uniqueness
through iterative deletion of dominated strategies.
This paper is related to studies that explore games of incomplete information with mul-
3Throughout this paper, increasing (decreasing) implies strictly increasing (decreasing), and nonde-
creasing (nonincreasing) implies weakly increasing (decreasing).
3tidimensional actions, types or payoﬀ parameters. McAdams (2003) provides a suﬃcient
condition for the existence of an isotone pure strategy equilibrium in a class of games of
incomplete information with multidimensional actions and types. Oury (2005) considers
global games with multidimensional actions and payoﬀ parameters, and shows that the
limit uniqueness result of Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) extends to this setting. In
both these studies, the elements of multidimensional actions can be chosen independently.
In contrast, in the present paper, speculators can attack at most one target, or more gen-
erally, can sell at most a ﬁxed amount of all target currencies combined. This assumption
imposes restrictions on the possible combinations of actions toward each country, and as
an important consequence, there is no complementarity within own actions, unlike Oury
(2005).
This paper also has some similarities with Steiner (2007), which examines a mobile
game in which agents in a sector coordinate to make an investment and have the outside
option of leaving the current coordination problem (i.e., sector) for other problems (i.e.,
other sectors). However, while agents in the present paper receive private signals of
multiple fundamentals, in Steiner (2007) agents receive private signals only of the funda-
mentals of the current sector and, consequently, the equilibrium remains characterized by
threshold values, instead of threshold functions.
Finally, there are a number of studies that adopt the contraction mapping approach
to examine the equilibrium of games with strategic complementarities. Levin (2001)
explores an overlapping generations games in which agents, having an incentive to co-
ordinate and facing uncertainty in future states of the world, sequentially choose their
actions. Using the contraction mapping theorem, Levin (2001) shows the existence of
a unique equilibrium when agents believe their actions will have no inﬂuence on future
play. Mason and Valentinyi (2007) applies the contraction mapping argument to prove
the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a class of games of incomplete informa-
tion that exhibits, unlike the typical global games environment, large heterogeneity in
agents’ types. Mathevet (2010) considers ﬁnite global games in which the existence of
pure strategy equilibria follows from the standard argument for supermodular games4,
and establishes uniqueness of equilibrium by showing that the best response function is
weak contraction. The present paper considers a multidimensional environment substan-
tially diﬀerent from these studies, and applies the contraction approach to the threshold
fundamentals functions, instead of the best response function.




The model follows a simpliﬁed version of that in Morris and Shin (1998), except that
speculators can now choose to attack one of multiple potential targets, creating a new
dimension of coordination. There are N > 1 countries indexed by j ∈ {1,2,...,N},
whose currencies are also referred to as currency j. Each currency is pegged to a foreign
currency. Country j’s economic fundamentals are denoted as θj, and θ1, θ2, ...,θN are
independently drawn from a uniform distribution over the entire real line.
There is a continuum of risk-neutral speculators, indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Instead of ob-
serving the true values of θj, speculators receive noisy private signals of them. Speculator
i’s private signal of θj, denoted as x
j










i are independently drawn from N (0,1/βj), βj > 0.5
Based on these N signals, speculators individually decide whether to attack any, but at
most one, of the N currencies. In what follows, a superscript −j implies that the variable



















= {0,1}, where a
j
i = 1 implies attacking
currency j and a
j
i = 0 implies not attacking it.6 While I focus here on pure strategy, and
also, do not consider partial attacks against a single or multiple currencies, the analysis
below shows that it is without loss of generality, except for measure zero of marginal
speculators facing equally attractive targets.
Denote by Aj : RN → [0,1] the measure, or the fraction since the measure of spec-




= (θj,θ−j). If the measure of speculators attacking j equals or ex-
ceeds the realized value of the fundamentals θj or, equivalently, if Aj (θj,θ−j) ≥ θj, the
attack against j is successful, forcing country j to abandon the peg; currency j then ﬂoats
and depreciates, providing proﬁts to those who attacked the currency. Otherwise, the
5The assumption that ǫ
j
i is normally distributed is stronger than is necessary for the results in Section
3; the argument goes through if ǫ
j
i is distributed according to a continuous probability density function
(pdf) with support on the real line. The normality assumption is necessary, however, when allowing for
public information in Section 5.1. The case of correlated signals is discussed in Section 5.2.
6Alternatively, I could rule out partial attacks (i.e., a
j
i ∈ (0,1)) from the outset and deﬁne speculator
i’s pure strategy as ai : RN → {0,1,...,N}, where ai = j ∈ {1,2,...,N} implies attacking country j,
and ai = 0 implies attacking none. The current formulation, however, allows us to see that the main
implications of the paper do not hinge on the exclusion of partial attacks.
5attack against currency j is unsuccessful and j sustains the peg. Thus, currency j always
abandons the peg for θj ≤ 0, and never does so for θj > 1. Since a speculator can attack
at most one currency, ΣN
j=1Aj (θj,θ−j) ≤ 1.
Speculators’ payoﬀs are summarized in Table 1. The payoﬀ for speculators who attack
a particular currency depends only on the success of that attack, and not on the outcomes
of attack for other currencies. Speculators attacking currency j receive 1 − cj > 0 if j
abandons the peg, and −cj < 0 otherwise, where cj ∈ (0,1) is a transaction cost, which
may diﬀer across j. Speculators attacking none of the currencies receive 0 regardless of
the outcome of the attack.
Currency j abandons the peg Currency j sustains the peg
Attack currency j 1 − cj −cj
Attack no currency 0 0
Table 1: Payoﬀs.
2.2 Two Benchmark Models
Before starting the main analysis, I discuss below two related models with a similar
environment, which will be used for comparison with the model of this paper.
2.2.1 Multiple Targets with Public Information
The ﬁrst benchmark is a version of the model in which there are N > 1 targets but
where the fundamentals θj, j = {1,2,...,N}, are publicly observed. For simplicity,
suppose that cj is the same for all countries.7 This can be considered a multi-country ex-
tension of Obstfeld (1996), which exhibits a tripartite division of fundamentals θ according
to the resulting forms of equilibrium: All speculators attack and the peg is abandoned if
θ ≤ 0, no speculator attacks and the peg is sustained if θ > 1, and both of these become
equilibria if θ ∈ (0,1].
With multiple targets, the Nash equilibrium is described as follows. If θj > 1 for all j,
no speculator attacks any currency and the peg is sustained for all j. If θj ≤ 0 for j = ˜ j
and θj > 1 for all j  = ˜ j, all speculators attack currency ˜ j, and the peg is abandoned for
˜ j and is sustained for all j  = ˜ j. In all other cases, there will be multiple equilibria. If
θj ≤ 0 for at least one j and θj ≤ 1 for at least one other j, each speculator attacks one of
7When cj is allowed to vary with j, the analysis requires examining various cases according to the
values of cj and θj. While not diﬃcult, such analysis does not provide additional insight on the diﬀerence
between public and private information environments.
6the currencies with θj ≤ 1, and currencies attacked by any speculator abandon the peg.
Finally, if θj > 0 for all j and θj ≤ 1 for at least one j, either (1) each speculator attacks
one of the currencies with θj ≤ 1, and currencies attacked by any speculator abandon the
peg, or (2) no speculator attacks any currency and the peg is sustained for all j.
Therefore, as in Obstfeld (1996), the total fraction of speculators participating in an
attack, ΣN
j=1Aj (θj,θ−j), always equals 0 or 1, and there may be a unique equilibrium
or multiple equilibria, depending on the realization of fundamentals. The presence of
multiple targets naturally complicates the structure of the equilibrium, but the economic
outcomes for each country are very similar to the single-country case: The peg is aban-
doned for sure if θj ≤ 0, sustained for sure if θj > 1, and either outcome is possible if
θj ∈ (0,1]. The only additional restriction is that max[θj,0], summed over countries that
abandon the peg, cannot exceed 1, which is the largest possible fraction of attackers. So,
whether a country sustains the peg depends little on the fundamentals of other countries,
which contrasts with the private information case analyzed in this paper.
2.2.2 Single Target with Private Information
The second benchmark is the canonical global games model with a single target. Since
N = 1, the superscript j denoting country j is redundant, and hence is removed; otherwise,
all assumptions in Section 2.1 are sustained. As is well known, in this environment, there
exists a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium that survives the iterative deletion of dominated
strategies. I brieﬂy describe this iterative deletion procedure8, so as to facilitate the
understanding of the corresponding procedure in the multiple target environment.
By assumption, the peg collapses for θ ≤ 0 = θ
∗
1 even if no speculator attacks the peg.
Thus, given the signal xi, the expected payoﬀ from attacking is at least
(1 − c)   Pr(θ ≤ θ
∗
1|xi) − c   (1 − Pr(θ ≤ θ
∗
1|xi)) = Pr(θ ≤ θ
∗
1|xi) − c, (2)
where Pr(θ ≤ θ
∗
1|xi) denotes the probability that θ ≤ θ
∗
1, conditional on receiving xi. Let
Φ be the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. Since θ follows








, which is decreasing in xi. Thus,
not attacking is a dominated strategy for speculators with signals xi < x∗
1, where













which completes the ﬁrst round of deletion.
8For a more detailed discussion on the iterative deletion of dominated strategies in this context, see
e.g., Atkeson (2000).
7In the second round of deletion, it is taken as given that speculators with signals
xi ≤ x∗
1 will attack the currency.9 Let Pr(xi ≤ x∗
1|θ) be the probability that xi ≤ x∗
1,
conditional on a given realization of θ; from the law of large numbers, this is also the







, which is decreasing in θ. So, even under the most
pessimistic belief about the success of attack, speculators must expect the peg to collapse


















Thus, not attacking is a dominated strategy for speculators with signals xi < x∗
2, where

















1 = 0, which implies x∗
2 > x∗
1. This completes the second round of deletion.





n=1 such that in
the n-th round of deletion, even under the most pessimistic belief about the success of
an attack, speculators must expect the peg to collapse for θ ≤ θ
∗
n, and not attacking
is a dominated strategy for xi < x∗






n=1 such that in the n-th round of deletion, even under the
most optimistic belief about the success of an attack, speculators must expect the peg to
be sustained for θ > ¯ θ∗
n, and attacking is a dominated strategy for xi > ¯ x∗
n.








, must both be solutions to




























But given Φ(a) = 1 − Φ(−a), (6) and (7) yield
θ
∗

















−1 (1 − c), (9)
hence θ
∗
∞ = ¯ θ∗
∞ = θ∗
s and x∗
∞ = ¯ x∗
∞ = x∗
s. Thus, with a single target, the equilibrium
is characterized by a threshold signal x∗
s and threshold fundamentals θ∗
s such that each
speculator attacks if and only if xi ≤ x∗
s, and the peg is abandoned if and only if θ ≤ θ∗
s.
9Having a weak, instead of strict, inequality here presumes that speculators attack when they are
indiﬀerent; such a tie-breaking rule is immaterial.
83 Analysis of the Main Model
3.1 Overview
I now turn to the main model of this paper, which features multiple targets and pri-
vate information. I show below that with N = 2 countries, or with any N symmetric
countries, the equilibrium of this speculative attack game can be obtained by iterative
deletion of dominated strategies. Such equilibrium takes the following form: speculator
i attacks currency j if x
j





, and only if x
j





, where xj∗ : RN−1 →
R is continuous and nondecreasing. The associated outcomes of attack are such that
currency j abandons the peg if and only if θj ≤ θj∗(θ−j), where θj∗ : RN−1 → (0,1) is
continuous and increasing. Thus, the equilibrium is characterized by a unique combi-
nation of threshold signal functions xj∗ and threshold fundamentals functions θj∗. As a
consequence, the outcomes of attack for all countries are uniquely pinned down given the
fundamentals, which contrasts with the public information case discussed above.
The argument proceeds as follows. First, I adapt the iterative deletion procedure
discussed above to this multiple target environment. This procedure generates, for each
country, an increasing sequence of threshold functions starting from ‘below’, and a decreas-
ing sequence of threshold functions starting from ‘above’. Second, I deﬁne an operator
associated with these sequences, show that the operator is a contraction, and invoke the
contraction mapping theorem to show that there is a unique ﬁxed point of this operator,
corresponding to the limits of the sequences of functions from iterative deletion. Finally,
I show that the ‘lower’ and ‘upper’ limiting functions indeed coincide.
3.2 Iterative Deletion of Dominated Strategies
With multiple targets, speculators face not only the choice between attacking and not
attacking, but also the choice of which country to attack, which complicates the procedure
of iterative deletion of dominated strategies. To obtain the sequences of functions that
converge to the equilibrium functions, one must combine deletion from ‘above’ and ‘below’,
instead of proceeding separately as in the single-country case discussed in Section 2.2.2.
For any θ−j, let θ
j∗
n (θ−j) and ¯ θj∗
n (θ−j) denote, respectively, the value of θj associated
with the most pessimistic and the most optimistic beliefs about the success of attack

















n (xi) and ¯ Γj∗
n (xi) denote, respectively, the expected
payoﬀ from attacking currency j under the belief that j abandons the peg if and only
if θj ≤ θ
j∗
n (θ−j), and that under the belief that j abandons the peg if and only if θj ≤
¯ θj∗
n (θ−j). Associated with these extreme beliefs are functions xj∗
n and ¯ xj∗
n such that in









, and attacking j
is strictly dominated for x
j






















Recall that for θj ≤ 0, currency j abandons the peg even if no speculator attacks j,
and for θj > 1, j sustains the peg even if all speculators attack it. Thus, in the ﬁrst round
of deletion, speculators must believe, even under the most pessimistic belief about the
success of attack against currency j, that j abandons the peg for θj ≤ 0 = θ
j∗
1 (θ−j), and
even under the most optimistic belief about the success of attack against j, that j sustains
the peg for θj > 1 = ¯ θ
j∗
1 (θ−j). Let us now compute Γ
j∗
1 and ¯ Γ
j∗























































































where ˜ φ−j is the joint pdf of N −1 independent normal noises, ǫ
−j
i . Letting φ be the pdf















1 (xi) = Pr
￿
θ























































is the value of x
j
i such that not attacking currency j is






















































, even under the most pessimistic belief about the success of attack against
currency j and the most optimistic beliefs about the success of attacks against other
currencies, the expected payoﬀ from attacking j exceeds that from other alternatives (i.e.,


































10The inﬁmum may not exist when cj > ck, since for suﬃciently small xk
i , ¯ Γk∗










1 (xi), hence Γ
j∗
1 (xi) < ¯ Γk∗
1 (xi) for arbitrarily small x
j
i. Similar situations may









= −∞ if the supremum does not exist.11 Given x
−j











i such that for x
j








, even under the most optimistic belief about the
success of attack against currency j and the most pessimistic beliefs about the success of
attacks against other currencies, speculators prefer not to attack j.










will attack currency j, and those with signals x
j





































1 and ¯ x
j∗
1 , spec-
ulators must believe, even under the most pessimistic belief about the success of attack
against j, that j abandons the peg for θj ≤ θ
j∗
2 (θ−j), and even under the most optimistic
















































































Clearly, 1 = ¯ θ
j∗
1 (θ−j) ≥ ¯ θ
j∗
2 (θ−j) ≥ θ
j∗
2 (θ−j) ≥ θ
j∗
1 (θ−j) = 0 for all θ−j.




n , ¯ Γj∗
n ,xj∗










































































































































































































11The supremum may not exist when cj > ck, since for suﬃciently small xk
i , Γ
k∗

























opposite case where ¯ Γ
j∗








for arbitrarily large x
j
i does not arise, since ¯ Γ
j∗
1 (xi)






1 (xi) = −cj < 0. The same applies to subsequent rounds.
11For any X ⊆ Rl and g,g′ : X → R, write g ≥ g′ to imply g (x) ≥ g′(x) for any
x ∈ X. Then, given ¯ θ
j∗






1 , (17) and (18) imply ¯ Γ
j∗







which in turn implies ¯ x
j∗






1 from (19) and (20). But then, (21) and
(22) imply ¯ θ
j∗
















n=1 are nondecreasing sequences and
￿¯ θj∗
n , ¯ Γj∗




are nonincreasing sequences, where 1 ≥ ¯ θj∗
n ≥ θ
j∗
n ≥ 0, ¯ Γj∗
n ≥ Γ
j∗
n , and ¯ xj∗
n ≥ xj∗
n for all n.
There are several points that should be noted about the procedure described above.
First, Γ
j∗
n (xi) and ¯ Γj∗
n (xi) are always decreasing in x
j
i, and so are Γ
j∗
n (xi) − ¯ Γk∗
n (xi) and
¯ Γj∗
n (xi) − Γ
k∗
n (xi) when θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗









































, so in each round, all strictly dominated strategies are
eliminated. When θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗
n are not necessarily nondecreasing, however, some strictly
dominated strategies may be left uneliminated in each round. This is not an issue of
concern, since the order of deletion of strictly (as opposed to weakly) dominated strategies
is irrelevant. Second, while the procedure above is a systematic method for deleting
strictly dominated strategies, it is not the only possible procedure, since the order of
deletion is irrelevant. What is critical is to eliminate only strictly dominated strategies,
and the deﬁnitions of xj∗
n and ¯ xj∗
n in (19) and (20) guarantee that this is the case, even
when θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗
n are not continuous and nondecreasing.











is a nonincreasing sequence in R, where each sequence is, respectively, bounded above and











verge pointwise. However, this argument is insuﬃcient to adequately explore the issues
of main interest, such as the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium threshold functions.
These issues are addressed by resorting to the contraction mapping theorem.
3.3 Contraction Mapping
















must deﬁne an operator representing this mapping on an adequate space, such that the
contraction mapping theorem can be applied.
For any X ⊆ Rl, let B(X,RN) denote the space of bounded, continuous, vector-
valued functions g : X → RN, g =
￿
g1,g2,...,gN￿
, equipped with the max-sup norm
||g|| ≡ maxN
j=1(supz∈X |gj (z)|). Further, let ˜ B(X,RN) denote the space of bounded,




with the same norm. Then, ˜ B(X,RN) is a closed subset of B(X,RN).















n , ¯ θ2∗










n).12 In other words,13
g
∗






















































If ˜ B(RN,R2N) is a complete metric space, T : ˜ B(RN,R2N) → ˜ B(RN,R2N), and T is a
contraction, then the contraction mapping theorem implies that T has a unique ﬁxed point




denote this ﬁxed point, and x∗ =
￿
x1∗,x2∗,...,xN∗￿
, ¯ x∗ =
￿
¯ x1∗, ¯ x2∗,..., ¯ xN∗￿
be the associated threshold signal functions. Since the theorem also
implies that g∗
n converges to this ﬁxed point from any g∗
0 ∈ ˜ B(RN,R2N), this ﬁxed point
corresponds to the limiting functions from the iterative deletion of dominated strategies.
Once this step is accomplished, it remains to show θ
∗ = ¯ θ∗; this implies x∗ = ¯ x∗, such







, and never does so if x
j





















n+1 = ¯ θ∗
n+1, and invoking the corollary to the contraction
mapping theorem.
Thus, the key is to show that T satisﬁes the requirement of the contraction mapping
theorem. It is straightforward to show that ˜ B(RN,R2N) is a complete metric space.
For N = 2, one can further show that T : ˜ B(RN,R2N) → ˜ B(RN,R2N) and that T is a
contraction mapping. For N > 2, this can be shown only for the symmetric target case,
and requires a slightly modiﬁed approach. The next two subsections examine these cases
in turn, and discuss the resulting equilibrium.
3.4 Equilibrium with N = 2 Targets
For N = 2, one can show that iterative deletion of dominated strategies yields a unique
combination of equilibrium threshold functions, as summarized below.14
Proposition 1. For N = 2, the equilibrium is characterized by a unique combination of
threshold signal functions xj∗ and threshold fundamentals functions θj∗, j = {1,2}, such
that
12The reason for deﬁning an operator on threshold fundamentals functions, not threshold signal func-
tions, is that, unlike the former, which is guaranteed to have values in [0,1], the latter is not bounded.
13Alternatively, I could deﬁne θ
j∗
n and ¯ θ∗
n as functions of θ ∈ RN, where θ
j∗
n and ¯ θ∗
n are invariant to θj.
Such formulation simpliﬁes exposition but obscures the fact that θ
j∗
n and ¯ θ∗
n depend only on θ−j, which
is why the current formulation is chosen. In any case, these choices are not essential to the results.
14The proofs to all propositions are in the appendix.
131. A speculator attacks currency j if x
j





and only if x
j






xj∗ is continuous and increasing.
2. Country j abandons the peg if and only if θj ≤ θj∗ (θ−j), where θj∗ ∈ (0,1) and θj∗
is continuous and increasing.
The proof proceeds exactly as described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3; that is, by resorting
to the contraction mapping theorem to establish the existence and uniqueness of the ﬁxed
point of T, and by resorting to the corollary of this theorem to show that the lower and
upper threshold functions coincide at this ﬁxed point, and to obtain additional properties
of the equilibrium functions.
Proposition 1 completely speciﬁes the speculators’ attacking strategy, except when
x
j





. This corresponds to the case in which the speculator is indiﬀerent between
attacking j, and either attacking some other currency or not attacking. Therefore, once
the tie-breaking rule is speciﬁed, iterative deletion of dominated strategies leads to a
unique equilibrium. Since marginal speculators with signals x
j






zero, such tie-breaking rule has no impact on the outcomes of attack; the combination of
fundamentals (θ1,θ2) uniquely pins down whether countries 1 and 2 sustain or abandon
the peg. For the same reason, focusing on pure strategy and ruling out partial attacks is
also immaterial.
Note that in the equilibrium above, the threshold fundamentals and the threshold
signals of one country are aﬀected by the fundamentals and signals of the other country,
even though neither the fundamentals nor the signals of the two countries are correlated.
More precisely, a speculator is more willing to attack currency j when that speculator’s
signal for the other country is strong, and country j is more likely to abandon the peg
when the other country has strong fundamentals.
3.5 Equilibrium with Symmetric N > 2 Targets
For N > 2, the argument above does not apply, at least immediately, for the following
reason. Recall the operator T deﬁned by (17)–(22). When θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗
n are bounded,
continuous and nondecreasing, it is possible to show that the Blackwell’s suﬃcient condi-
tions for contraction, namely monotonicity and discounting, are satisﬁed. What cannot
be shown is that θ
j∗
n+1 and ¯ θ
j∗
n+1 are again nondecreasing. To see this, consider the case
of N = 3, and take (x2
i,x3
i) such that x1∗
n (x2
i,x3

































































14Now, take ∆ > 0 suﬃciently small, and consider x1∗
n (x2
i,x3
i + ∆). Since θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗
n are
continuous by assumption, so are Γ
j∗
n and ¯ Γj∗
n . Then, x1∗
n (x2
i,x3
i + ∆) is still determined











































i rises to x3
i + ∆, Γ
1∗
n and ¯ Γ2∗
n weakly increase since θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗
n are nondecreasing
by assumption. To restore equality, x1




i + ∆) < x1∗
n (x2
i,x3
i). In other words, while x1∗
n (x2
i,x3
i) deﬁned by (25) is in-
creasing in x2
i, it need not be nondecreasing in x3
i. But then, (21) implies that θ
1∗
n+1 (θ2,θ3)
may not be nondecreasing in θ3.
More generally, the argument above implies that for N > 2, xj∗
n and ¯ xj∗
n need not be
nondecreasing, which in turn implies that θ
j∗
n+1 and ¯ θ
j∗
n+1 may not be nondecreasing even if
θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗
n are so.15 Thus, T cannot be shown to be a self-map on ˜ B(RN,R2N). Deﬁning
T instead on B(RN,R2N) does not resolve the issue, because then T turns out to lose the
discounting property.
This issue can be overcome for the symmetric case in which βj and cj are the same
across j. The trick is to slightly modify the procedure of iterative deletion as follows. In
the n-th round of iteration, compute Γ
j∗
n and ¯ Γj∗
n from θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗
n by (17) and (18), and
then xj∗
n and ¯ xj∗





is dominated by xj∗






























Then, deﬁne functions x
j∗




















g ∈ ¯ X
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n |g ≤ g
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15Note that this problem does not arise for N = 2. If θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗










i and nondecreasing in x2







is decreasing in x2














is nondecreasing in θ2.










This modiﬁcation forces θ
j∗
n+1 and ¯ θ
j∗
n+1 to be nondecreasing, by eliminating the strate-

















, and ‘attack currency
j’ only for x
j

















n,ND and ¯ x
j∗
n,ND are nondecreasing.





n and ¯ x
j∗
n,ND ∈ ¯ Xj∗
n is critical. On the other hand, choosing x
j∗
n,ND and ¯ x
j∗
n,ND
to be the largest and smallest function, respectively, in X
j∗
n and ¯ Xj∗
n is inessential, be-
cause the order of deletion of strictly dominated strategies is irrelevant. This can also be
seen from the fact that when the contraction mapping theorem applies, the ﬁxed point is
achieved from any initial value. Then, one can show that the operator T ′ is a contraction
on ˜ B(RN,R2N), and hence has a unique ﬁxed point, as stated in the following proposition.





The ﬁnal step is to show θ
∗ = ¯ θ∗, which is achieved by taking advantage of the
symmetry across targets, namely that βj and cj are common to all j. The following
deﬁnition is introduced to facilitate the discussion.
Deﬁnition. hj : RN→ R, j = {1,2,...,N}, are said to be symmetric across j if for
any s = (s1,s2,...,sN) and j,k ∈ {1,2,...,N}, (1) hj (s) = hk (s′) where s′ is created
from s by exchanging its j-th and k-th element, and (2) hj (sj,s−j) = hj (sj, ˜ s−j) for any
permutation ˜ s−j = (˜ s1,..., ˜ sj−1, ˜ sj+1,..., ˜ sN) of {s1,...,sj−1,sj+1,...,sN}.
For hj : RN−1→ R, j = {1,2,...,N}, which are functions only of s−j, the deﬁnition
above can be applied by considering hj as functions of s ∈ RN, whose values do not
vary with sj.16 In the present context, that hj is symmetric across j simply implies

























n+1) with the same properties. Further, for such g∗
n, one can
also show that xj∗
n = ¯ xj∗
n and that these are nondecreasing, which implies xj∗




n,ND = ¯ x
j∗
n,ND. It then follows that with symmetric targets, the unique ﬁxed point of
T ′ is such that θ
∗ = ¯ θ∗ ≡ θ∗, which yields x∗ = ¯ x∗ ≡ x∗. But since the set of eliminated
strategies each round by the procedure corresponding to operator T ′ is a subset of that
associated with operator T, the unique ﬁxed point of T ′ must coincide with that of T, or
equivalently, with the limiting function from the iterative deletion of dominated strategies.
This argument establishes the following results.

















n is symmetric across
j, then for any a,b ∈ R, θ
j∗
n (a,b) = θ
j∗
n (b,a) for all j, and the value is independent of j.
16Proposition 3. For N > 2, suppose βj = β > 0 and cj = c ∈ (0,1) for all j ∈
{1,2,...,N}. Then the equilibrium is characterized by a unique combination of threshold
signal functions xj∗ and threshold fundamentals functions θj∗ that are symmetric across
j, such that
1. A speculator attacks currency j if x
j





and only if x
j











≤ mink =j xk
i.
2. Country j abandons the peg if and only if θj ≤ θj∗ (θ−j), where θj∗ ∈ (0,1) and θj∗
is continuous and increasing.
Proposition 3 implies, as in the case of N = 2, that the equilibrium is unique up
to ties and that the outcomes of attack for the N countries are uniquely pinned down






≤ mink =j xk
i implies that if a speculator attacks, the speculator attacks
the currency with the lowest signal.
This approach is, however, silent on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium thresh-
old functions in environments with N > 2 nonsymmetric targets. The argument for es-




of T ′ does not hinge on
targets being symmetric. However, with nonsymmetric targets, θ
∗
n = ¯ θ∗
n does not imply
θ
∗
n+1 = ¯ θ∗
n+1. This is because, as observed from (29) and (30), x
j∗




n = ¯ xj∗
n , unless xj∗
n (= ¯ xj∗
n ) is nondecreasing, which cannot be guaranteed to be the case.
Accordingly, the ﬁnal step of establishing θ
∗ = ¯ θ∗ cannot be accomplished.
4 Numerical Examples
It is shown above that for N = 2 targets, as well as for general N symmetric targets,
the equilibrium is characterized by threshold functions that are uniquely determined.
Unlike the threshold values of fundamentals and signal in the single-target case discussed
in Section 2.2.2, however, these functions cannot be obtained in closed form. This
section explores several numerical examples, in order to obtain additional insights on
these equilibrium functions.17
4.1 Symmetric and Nonsymmetric N = 2 Targets
This subsection discusses the case of N = 2, which is the main focus of the analysis.
17Detailed computational procedures are described in the appendix.
174.1.1 Symmetric Targets
I ﬁrst consider the case with common cj and βj. Note that results are symmetric
across two countries in this case, hence the explanations below apply when the roles of
country 1 and 2 are reversed. Figures 1–4 illustrate the equilibrium threshold functions
for c1 = c2 = c = 0.1 and β1 = β2 = β = 1.
As observed from Figure 1, the threshold signal function x1∗ is composed of two parts;
one part that coincides with the 45 degree line, where the speculator is indiﬀerent between
attacking currency 1 and 2, and a ﬂatter part, where the speculator is indiﬀerent between
attacking currency 1 and not attacking. Note that x1∗ (x2
i) < x∗




i → ∞, where x∗
s is the threshold signal in the single-target case, given by (9). This
can be understood as follows. Since each speculator expects some other speculators to
attack currency 2, the expected payoﬀ from attacking currency 1 is, for any x2
i, lower
than with a single target. So, speculators choose a less aggressive attacking strategy, and
thus x1∗ (x2
i) lies below x∗
s. But as x2
i increases, a speculator infers greater values of θ2
and expects a smaller fraction of other speculators to attack currency 2, so the presence
of currency 2 will have a smaller eﬀect on the speculator’s decision to attack currency 1.
As x2
i → ∞, the presence of country 2 becomes irrelevant, and the speculator behaves as
if currency 1 is the only target. Speculators’ attacking decisions for given signals (x1
i,x2
i)
can be observed from Figure 2. Observe that functions x1∗ and x2∗ divide the (x1
i,x2
i)
space into three regions according to the corresponding attacking decision.
Similarly, Figure 3 indicates that θ1∗ (θ2) < θ∗
s and θ1∗ (θ2) → θ∗
s as θ2 → ∞, where θ∗
s
is the threshold fundamentals in the single-target case, given by (8). Thus, the presence
of a second target always makes the survival of a peg more likely. This implication is
not surprising because, given that the total measure of speculators is ﬁxed, the presence
of multiple targets serves to diversify the attacking pressure. Of greater importance is
that θ1∗ (θ2) is highly dependent on the value of θ2. This can be more clearly observed in
Figure 4, in which θ1∗ and θ2∗ divide the (θ1,θ2) space into four regions according to the
outcomes of attack for the two countries. Figure 4 shows that the success of attack on
one country depends critically on the other country’s fundamentals, and not just on its
own. Put diﬀerently, what matters here is not necessarily the value of the fundamentals
per se, but their value relative to the other target. Such a feature is completely lacking
in the public information case discussed in Section 2.2.1, unless it is exogenously imposed
through an equilibrium selection device.18
18For example, one can assume that in the multiple-equilibria region in which at most one peg can
fail (θ1,θ2 ∈ (0,1] and θ1 + θ2 > 1), the probability of speculators coordinating to attack currency 1 is
increasing in θ2, and vice versa. While such assumption may sound plausible, it is totally ad hoc.
18The comparison between θ1∗ and θ∗
s above assumes the same total measure of specu-
lators, normalized to one, for single and two-country environments. One may ask what
happens if the per country, not total, measure of speculators is ﬁxed. In other words,
the question is whether doubling both the number of targets and the population of spec-
ulators, or equivalently, pooling the speculators who were segmented into two distinct
markets, makes collapse of the peg more likely or less so. This is an interesting ques-
tion because, while doubling the population of speculators increases the potential size of
the attack towards each country, the presence of multiple targets may make coordina-
tion among speculators more diﬃcult, and it is not obvious which of the two channels
dominates. To answer this question, Figure 5 draws θ1∗ and θ2∗ along with the lines
corresponding to θ∗
s,0.5, the threshold value of fundamentals in the single-target case with
measure 0.5 of speculators.19 Note that θ1∗ can be lower than θ∗
s,0.5, which implies that
currency 1 may be able to sustain the peg, even with the values of fundamentals that
force country 1 to abandon the peg in the single-target case with half the population of
speculators. However, this can occur only when country 2 falls victim to attack; indeed,
the region of (θ1,θ2), under which both currencies sustain the peg (i.e., the upper right
region of Figure 5 in which both θ1 and θ2 are above the relevant threshold), is smaller
when speculators are pooled. This ﬁnding turns out to be robust to changes in β and c.
Another interesting exercise involves varying β. Figure 6 illustrates the outcomes of
attack when β1 and β2 are raised to 4, corresponding to more precise private signals than
in Figure 4. Note from (8) that the value of θ∗
s is independent of β, hence Figures 4 and
6 are directly comparable. Comparing Figures 4 and 6, we observe that in Figure 6, θ1∗
is higher for relatively large values of θ2, and is lower for relatively small values of θ2. As
a result, the region of fundamentals (θ1,θ2) for which both pegs survive, and the region
for which both pegs fail, are both smaller in Figure 6. The implication is that increased
precision of signals has a decoupling eﬀect, in the sense that the two countries are less
likely to face the same outcomes of attack. When private signals become more precise,
speculators are able to better discern the country with relatively weak fundamentals, hence
the attacking pressure tends to be more concentrated on that country. Thus, the country
with relatively strong fundamentals manages to survive the attack for a wider range of its
own fundamentals, at the cost of placing the other country in a more vulnerable situation.
Conversely, if one interprets the case of simultaneous collapses of the peg as contagion,
the model suggests that contagion is more likely with less precise signals. However, such
an implication for contagion based on a one-shot game requires some caution, since the
implication may be quite diﬀerent if there are multiple rounds of speculative attacks.











s,0.5 = 0.5(1 − c) = 0.5θ∗
s, and x∗
s,0.5 = θ∗






19To see this, note that greater precision of signals expands the region of fundamentals
(θ1,θ2) for which at least one country abandons the peg. But once one country ﬂoats
its currency, the remaining country faces all speculators alone, such that it must now
abandon the peg for a wider range of its own fundamentals. If contagion is interpreted in
such an environment under repeated speculative attacks, then more accurate information
indeed facilitates contagion.
4.1.2 Nonsymmetric Targets
Let us now examine the nonsymmetric case, where c1 = c2 = 0.1, β1 = 1, and β2 = 4.
Figure 7 shows the attacking decisions in the (x1
i,x2
i) space. Note that unlike in Figure 2,
the part of x1∗ (x2
i) where the speculator is indiﬀerent between attacking currency 1 and 2
is steeper than the 45 degree line. The intuition is that country 2’s signal, which is more
precise, has a stronger impact on the speculator’s decision than country 1’s signal. For
example, when both x1
i and x2
i are relatively large (say, equal to 1), speculators recognize
that θ2 is more certain to be strong than θ1, and hence prefer to attack currency 1 over
currency 2. The opposite is true when both x1
i and x2
i are relatively small.
Figure 8 illustrates the outcomes of attack in the (θ1,θ2) space. Note that the outcome
of attack for currency 1 is more strongly dependent on θ2 than the outcome of attack for
currency 2 is on θ1, which can be understood as follows. Since β1 < β2, country 2’s
fundamentals, whether strong or weak, are perceived more accurately by speculators.
Thus, when country 2 has strong fundamentals, speculators recognize this and tend to
shift their target to country 1, placing country 1 in a vulnerable position. Conversely,
when country 2 has weak fundamentals, speculators also recognize this, and tend to shift
their target to country 2, relaxing the attacking pressure on country 1.
This explanation suggests that what really matters for the proﬁle of the threshold
fundamentals function of a country (say, θ1∗) is the precision of the signal for the other
country (β2), not its own (β1). Indeed, we observe that in Figure 8, θ1∗ resembles that in
Figure 6, where β1 = β2 = 4, whereas θ2∗ is similar to that in Figure 4, where β1 = β2 = 1.
The implication of this observation, with respect to the issues of contagion and de-
coupling mentioned above, is as follows. Suppose the precision of private signals reﬂects
the transparency of government policy20, such that country j’s government authority can,
to some extent, control βj. Then, what country 1’s government authority can aﬀect is
mainly how the outcome of attack for currency 2 depends on country 1’s fundamentals;
the issue which is probably more important to country 1’s government authority, the de-
20Heinemann and Illing (2002) adopts such an interpretation and discusses the impact of transparency
on the probability of successful speculative attack.
20pendence of the outcome of attack for currency 1 on country 2’s fundamentals, is instead
at the discretion of country 2’s government authority.
4.2 Symmetric N = 3 Targets
I conclude this section by setting forth an example for the symmetric N > 2 case.
Figures 9 and 10 depict the equilibrium threshold functions for N = 3, where cj = 0.1
and βj = 1 for all j. Note that the threshold functions are symmetric across j.
Figure 9 depicts x3∗ (x1
i,x2
i); speculators receiving signals below the graph attack coun-
try 3. As in the case of N = 2, x3∗ (x1
i,x2
i) is composed of two parts; the part that coincides
with min{x1
i,x2
i}, where the speculator is indiﬀerent between attacking currency 3 and
one of the other two currencies, and the ﬂatter part, where the speculator is indiﬀerent
between attacking currency 3 and not attacking. While x∗
s is not indicated in the ﬁgure
to avoid graphical clutter, x3∗ (x1
i,x2
i) < x∗
s and x3∗ approaches x∗
s as both x1
i and x2
i tend
to ∞. The intuition is similar to the N = 2 case. Compared to the single-target case,
speculators choose a less aggressive attacking strategy towards country 3, since the at-
tacking pressure is spread out over three countries. But as x1
i and x2
i increase, speculators
expect a smaller fraction of other speculators to attack these countries, so the presence of
the other two countries becomes less important for the decision to attack country 3. As
both x1
i and x2
i approach ∞, the speculator behaves as if currency 3 is the only target.
Note that x1∗, x2∗ and x3∗ divide the (x1
i,x2
i,x3
i) space into four regions according to
speculators’ attacking decisions.
Figure 10 illustrates θ3∗ (θ1,θ2); country 3 abandons the peg when the combination
of the fundamentals lies on or below the graph. As observed from Figure 10, θ3∗ (θ1,θ2)
increases smoothly in θ1 and θ2. Moreover, θ3∗ (θ1,θ2) approaches 0 as either θ1 or θ2
tends to −∞, and approaches θ∗
s as both θ1 and θ2 approach ∞. This implies that if there
is one country with very weak fundamentals, speculators target this country, relaxing the
attacking pressure on other countries. The threshold fundamentals functions for the
three countries divide the (θ1,θ2,θ3) space into eight regions according to the outcomes
of attack for the three countries.
5 Discussions and Extensions
5.1 Introduction of Public Information
I have thus far restricted speculators’ information on the fundamentals to private
signals by assuming an uninformative prior of the fundamentals. Here, I relax this
21assumption and introduce public information.
In the standard model with a single target, it has been shown (e.g., Morris and Shin
(2002), Hellwig (2002)) that multiple equilibria may exist if there is public information
that is suﬃciently informative relative to private information. For example, when the
fundamentals θ are drawn from a common prior N (y,1/α) in the model of Section 2.2.2,




2π. In other words, the suﬃcient




2π. The following proposition provides
the corresponding suﬃcient condition in the model with multiple targets.
Proposition 4. (1) For N=2, suppose the common prior distribution of θj is N (yj,1/αj)




2π for j = {1,2}. (2) For any N,
suppose that βj = β > 0, cj = c ∈ (0,1), and that the common prior distribution of θj is





When the suﬃcient condition in Proposition 4 is not satisﬁed, it turns out that the
corresponding operator cannot be proved to be a contraction. Note that the suﬃcient
condition for a unique combination of equilibrium threshold functions is very similar to
the suﬃcient condition for a unique equilibrium in the single-target case. Such similarity
is not a coincidence. In fact, it is possible to apply the contraction approach used in this
paper to the single-target environment, as can be seen as follows.
Consider a N = 2 case with c2 > 1, such that while there are two potential targets,
attacking currency 2 is never proﬁtable. Then, no speculator ever attacks currency
2, hence θ
1∗
n (θ2) and ¯ θ1∗
n (θ2) become independent of θ2. Using such constant valued
functions, we can proceed with the iterative deletion as in the proof of Proposition 4(1);








n converge to the same, constant valued function, which establishes the unique
equilibrium result. Except for the inequality being strict, this condition coincides with
the known suﬃcient condition for equilibrium uniqueness.21
5.2 Correlated Noises
This paper has assumed throughout that the noises ǫ
j
i are independent across j. This
assumption enables the focus on the direct impact of increasing the number of targets





2π, the operator T is only a weak contraction, hence the contraction mapping
theorem does not apply. However, in the single-target case, a slight reformulation yields an operator
which maps a compact space to itself, so one can instead invoke Edelstein’s ﬁxed point theorem (Edelstein
(1962)) to show that there exists a unique ﬁxed point, and thus a unique equilibrium.
22the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium threshold functions shown in Section 3, as
stated by the proposition below.
Proposition 5. (1) For N = 2, suppose ǫ
j
i, j = {1,2}, are drawn from a continuous and
bounded joint pdf ϕ : R2 → R++. Then, Proposition 1 holds. (2) For N > 2, suppose
βj = β > 0 and cj = c ∈ (0,1) for all j, and suppose ǫ
j
i, j = {1,2,...,N}, are drawn
from a continuous bounded joint pdf ϕ : RN → R++ that is symmetric across j. Then,
Proposition 3 holds.
At ﬁrst glance, correlated noises may appear to create complications in establishing
that the relevant operator is a contraction. Proposition 5 states, however, that this is
not the case, and the same equilibrium properties can be obtained even when noise is
correlated. Intuitively, this is because, whatever the correlation among the noises, a
higher value of x
j
i suggests a higher value of θj, and a higher value of θj increases the
proportion of strong signals x
j
i, which is key for the equilibrium to be characterized by
threshold functions.
6 Conclusions
This paper has examined a global games model of speculative attacks in which there
exist multiple targets for speculators to attack. With two countries, or any N symmetric
countries, the equilibrium is characterized by threshold signal functions and threshold
fundamentals functions, which are uniquely determined for each country. Accordingly, in
these cases, a country’s fundamentals are evaluated in relation to those of other countries,
and the outcomes of attack are uniquely determined given the fundamentals of all coun-
tries. Such an equilibrium property is a natural extension to that in the canonical global
games model with a single target, and it starkly contrasts with that in a multiple-target
environment with publicly observed fundamentals.
This paper has set forth a number of numerical exercises to generate further insight
into these equilibrium threshold functions, mainly focusing on the two-country case, and
has derived several implications. First, the addition of the second target lowers the
threshold fundamentals and facilitates a country to sustain the peg, if the total population
of speculators is held constant. When instead the per-country population of speculators
is held constant, the threshold fundamentals may still be lower than in the single-target
case, but only when the other country falls victim to speculative attack. Second, increased
quality of private information has a decoupling eﬀect, such that under greater precision
of signals, the two countries are less likely to face the same economic outcome. This
is because, with greater precision of signals, speculators are more capable of uncovering
23the country with the weaker fundamentals and of coordinating their attacks on that
country. Third, the precision of signals for country 1 mainly aﬀects how country 2’s
threshold fundamentals function varies with country 1’s fundamentals, not how country
1’s threshold fundamentals function varies with country 2’s fundamentals. This restricts
the usefulness, as a policy tool, of varying the transparency of government policy, unless
countries coordinate on such policy.
Finally, this paper has considered the extension of introducing public information
through an informative prior of the fundamentals, and has shown that the suﬃcient
condition for the existence of unique equilibrium threshold functions closely resembles
the known suﬃcient condition for the unique equilibrium in the single-target case. In
order to relate these conditions, this paper has described how its contraction argument
can be applied to the single-target case.
The environment of this paper, namely global games of regime change with multiple
regimes, is not only of theoretical interest, but has many interesting real-life applications.
Combining the iterative deletion procedure with the contraction mapping argument turns
out to be a powerful approach for examining such an environment, not only for the theo-
retical analysis of the equilibrium, but also for numerical computations. One limitation of
this approach is that it is not applicable when there are more than two nonsymmetric tar-
gets, in which case the threshold functions may not always be nondecreasing. Obtaining,
for example, suﬃcient conditions for unique threshold functions in such an environment
appears to require a diﬀerent approach, and such pursuit is left for future research.
24Appendix A: Proofs
Proposition 1
Let operator T and spaces B(X,R2N), ˜ B(X,R2N) be as deﬁned in Section 3.3. If one
can show that ˜ B(RN,R2N) is a complete metric space, that T maps from ˜ B(RN,R2N)
to itself, and that T is a contraction, then the contraction mapping theorem implies
that there exists a unique ﬁxed point g∗ = (θ
∗, ¯ θ∗) of T. The proof then concludes by
establishing the properties of this ﬁxed point, most importantly θ
∗ = ¯ θ∗. Let these steps
be proved through a series of lemma.
Lemma 1. For any X ⊆ Rl, B(X,RN) is a Banach space.
Proof. That B(X,RN) is a normed vector space easily follows from the deﬁnition of a
normed vector space. It remains to show that B(X,RN) is complete, so that if {gn}
∞
n=1,
gn ∈ B(X,RN) ∀n, is a Cauchy sequence, there exists g ∈ B(X,RN) such that, for any
ǫ > 0, there exists Mǫ such that ||gn − g|| ≤ ǫ, all n ≥ Mǫ, where ||   || is the max-sup
norm. This is shown by extending the proof that the space of scalar-valued, bounded
continuous functions is complete (see e.g., Stokey and Lucas (1989), Theorem 3.1), and
involves three steps: (1) to ﬁnd a candidate for g, (2) to show {gn} converges to g in the
max-sup norm, and (3) to show g ∈ B(X,RN). First, ﬁx any z ∈ X. Then the sequence




















m(w)| = ||gn − gm||,
so it satisﬁes a Cauchy criterion, since {gn} is a Cauchy sequence by assumption, and its
convergence to some gj(z) ∈ R is assured since the space of real numbers is complete. So




n → gj pointwise for each j. Next, take
any ǫ > 0 and choose Mǫ so that n,m ≥ Mǫ implies ||gn − gm|| ≤ ǫ/2. This is possible





















n → gj pointwise, m can be chosen separately for each z so that |gj
m(z) −gj(z)| ≤
ǫ/2. Since the choice of z ∈ X was arbitrary, it follows that supz∈X |gj
n(z) − gj(z)| ≤ ǫ,
all n ≥ Mǫ. Since this holds for any j, it follows that ||gn − g|| ≤ ǫ, all n ≥ Mǫ.
Thus ||gn − g|| → 0 as n → ∞, since the choice of ǫ was arbitrary. Finally, let us show
that g ∈ B(X,RN), which is true if each gj is bounded, continuous and nondecreasing.
25Boundedness is obvious. For continuity, one needs to show that for any ǫ > 0 and
any z ∈ X, there exists δ > 0 such that |gj (z) − gj (w)| < ǫ if ||z − w||E < δ, where
||   ||E is the Euclidean norm on Rl. For any j, take any ǫ,z and choose k so that
supw∈X |gj(w) − g
j
k(w)| < ǫ/3. This is possible because, since gn → g in the max-sup
norm, each gj
n → gj in the sup norm. Then choose δ such that ||z − w||E < δ implies
|g
j
k (z) − g
j
k (w)| < ǫ/3. Since g
j
k is continuous, such a choice is possible. Then
|g
j (z) − g
j (w)| ≤ |g
j (z) − g
j
k (z)| + |g
j
k (z) − g
j
k (w)| + |g
j













so gj is continuous for all j. Therefore g ∈ B(X,RN), which completes the proof.
Given Lemma 1, B(X,RN) is a complete metric space with the metric d(f,g) = ||f−g||
for f,g ∈ B(X,RN), where ||   || is the max-sup norm. Thus, being a closed subset of
B(X,RN), ˜ B(X,RN) is also a complete metric space with the max-sup norm. Since this
is true for any X ⊆ Rl and N, ˜ B(R2,R4) is a complete metric space.
Lemma 2. T maps ˜ B(R2,R4) to itself.
Proof. Take any g∗
n such that g∗




n (θ1), ¯ θ1∗
n (θ2), ¯ θ2∗
n (θ1)) ∈ ˜ B(R2,R4).
To prove g∗
n+1 = Tg∗




n+1 and ¯ θ
j∗
n+1,j = {1,2}, are bounded, continuous and nondecreasing. Bound-




n+1 ∈ (0,1) from (21) and (22). For continuity, note
from (17) and (18) that if θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗
n are bounded, continuous and nondecreasing for
j = {1,2}, then Γ
j∗
n (xi) − ¯ Γk∗
n (xi) and ¯ Γj∗
n (xi) − Γ
k∗
n (xi) are bounded and continuous in
both arguments, decreasing in x
j
i, and nondecreasing in xk













are continuous and nondecreasing, and increasing for the range
of xk












are determined by the indiﬀerence condition between
attacking j and k under the corresponding beliefs. It then follows from (21) and (22)
that θ
j
n+1 and ¯ θ
j
n+1 are continuous and nondecreasing (in fact, increasing), hence g∗
n+1 ∈
˜ B(R2,R4).
Lemma 3. T is a contraction.
Proof. The proof proceeds by showing that the Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for a con-
traction are satisﬁed for each component function. Take any g∗




n (θ1), ¯ θ1∗
n (θ2), ¯ θ2∗
n (θ1))
˜ B(R2,R4). For monotonicity, ﬁx j ∈ {1,2} and deﬁne g∗∗
n ∈ ˜ B(R2,R4) by replacing the
j-th component of g∗
n, namely θ
j∗




n . Further, let Γ
∗∗
n , ¯ Γ∗∗
n , x∗∗





n+1 be the functions obtained from g∗∗









and (18) imply Γ
j∗∗
n (xi) ≥ Γ
j∗
n (xi), whereas ¯ Γ∗∗
n (xi) = ¯ Γ∗





n (xi) are decreasing in x
j
i, whereas ¯ Γk∗∗
n (xi) and ¯ Γk∗
n (xi) are nondecreasing in x
j
i for
k  = j, (19) implies xj∗∗
n ≥ xj∗




n+1, hence monotonicity holds.
For discounting, ﬁx j ∈ {1,2}, take any a ≥ 0 and deﬁne g#
n ∈ ˜ B(R2,R4) by replacing
the j-th component of g∗
n, namely θ
j∗
n , by θ
j∗
n + a. Let Γ
#
n , ¯ Γ#
n , x#






the functions obtained from g#
n by (17)–(22). Then, noting that Γ
j#
n (xi) and Γ
j∗
n (xi)
are decreasing in x
j
i, whereas ¯ Γk#
n (xi) and ¯ Γk∗
n (xi) are nondecreasing in x
j
i for k  = j,
xj#
n ≤ xj∗



























































2π > 0. Then, Φ
￿p






































































where λj ≡ γj/(1 + γj) ∈ (0,1). Thus, θ
j#
n+1 (θ−j) ≤ θ
j##
n+1 (θ−j) ≤ θ
j∗
n+1 (θ−j) + λja, and
since the choice of a ≥ 0 was arbitrary, discounting also holds. Repeating the argument
above for each component function of g∗
n, it follows that monotonicity and discounting
holds for θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗
n , j = {1,2}. Now, let g∗
n and g∗
n+1 be as deﬁned above, take any
g+
n ∈ ˜ B(R2,R4) such that
g+




n (θ1), ¯ θ1+
n (θ2), ¯ θ2+





























































































































































































































































which implies that T is a contraction.
Given Lemma 1–3, T has a unique ﬁxed point g∗ = (θ
∗, ¯ θ∗) from the contraction
mapping theorem. The ﬁnal step of the proof is to show θ
∗ = ¯ θ∗ ≡ θ∗, where θj∗ ∈ (0,1)
and θj∗ is continuous and increasing. Take g∗




n (θ1), ¯ θ1∗
n (θ2), ¯ θ2∗
n (θ1)) ∈
˜ B(R2,R4) such that θ
j∗
n = ¯ θj∗
n , j = {1,2}. Then, (17) and (18) imply Γ
j∗
n = ¯ Γj∗
n ≡ Γj∗
n .
But then, (19) and (20) imply xj∗
n = ¯ xj∗




continuous and decreasing in x
j













is empty (in which case, xj∗
n = ¯ xj∗
n = −∞), or else there is a
single value of x
j
i at which Γj∗









changes its sign. Therefore,
(21) and (22) imply θ
j∗




n+1. Moreover, arguing as in the proof of Lemma 2,
θ
j∗
n+1 ∈ (0,1) and θ
j∗
n+1 is continuous and increasing.
Now, let ˜ B′(R2,R4) denote the space of bounded, continuous, nondecreasing vector-
valued functions g : R2 → R4, g = (g1,g2,g3,g4) where g1 = g3 and g2 = g4, equipped with
the max-sup norm ||g|| ≡ maxN
j=1(supz∈R |gj (z)|). Further, let ˜ B′′(R2,R4) ⊆ ˜ B′(R2,R4)
be the space in which ‘nondecreasing’ in the deﬁnition of ˜ B′(R2,R4) is replaced by ‘in-
creasing’, and gj ∈ (0,1) for all j. Then, ˜ B′(R2,R4) is a closed subset of ˜ B(R2,R4),
and the argument above implies T
￿ ˜ B′(R2,R4)
￿
⊆ ˜ B′′(R2,R4) ⊆ ˜ B(R2,R4), so it follows
that g∗ ∈ ˜ B′′(R2,R4) (Stokey and Lucas (1989), Theorem 3.2, Corollary 1). Therefore,
θ
∗ = ¯ θ∗ ≡ θ∗, where θj∗ ∈ (0,1) and θj∗ is continuous and increasing, as was to be shown.￿
28Proposition 2
The proof is almost identical to the N = 2 case. First, since B(X,RN) is a Ba-
nach space as shown in Lemma 1, ˜ B(X,RN) is a complete metric space, and thus so is
˜ B(RN,R2N). That T ′ maps ˜ B(RN,R2N) to itself is also straightforward, except that this
time, xj∗
n and ¯ xj∗
n may not always be nondecreasing, but x
j∗
n,ND and ¯ x
j∗
n,ND are nondecreas-
ing by construction, such that θ
j
n+1 and ¯ θ
j
n+1 are nondecreasing (indeed, increasing). It
remains only to conﬁrm that using x
j∗
n,ND and ¯ x
j∗
n,ND, instead of xj∗
n and ¯ xj∗
n , to compute
θ
j
n+1 and ¯ θ
j
n+1 does not hamper the satisfaction of the Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for
contraction.
For monotonicity, ﬁx j ∈ {1,2,...,N} and deﬁne g∗∗
n ∈ ˜ B(RN,R2N) by replacing the
j-th component of g∗
n, namely θ
j∗




n . Let Γ
∗∗
n , ¯ Γ∗∗
n , x∗∗







n+1 be the functions obtained from g∗∗
n by (17)–(20) and (27)–(32), with cj = c and βj = β
for all j. Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 3, it follows that xj∗∗
n ≥ xj∗
























n,ND from the deﬁnition of x
j∗∗




n+1 from (31), which
implies monotonicity.
For discounting, ﬁx j ∈ {1,2,...,N}, take any a ≥ 0 and deﬁne g#
n ∈ ˜ B(RN,R2N)
by replacing the j-th component of g∗
n, namely θ
j∗
n , by θ
j∗
n + a. Let Γ
#
n , ¯ Γ#
n , x#






n+1 be the functions obtained from g#
n by (17)–(20) and (27)–(32). Proceeding
as in the proof of Lemma 3, xj#
n ≤ xj∗
n + a, which implies x
j#
n,ND − a ≤ xj#




















n,ND − a ≤ x
j∗




n,ND + a. Thus, arguing as in the proof of
Lemma 3, θ
j#
n+1 (θ−j) ≤ θ
j∗




2π and λ ≡ γ/(1 + γ) ∈ (0,1),
and since the choice of a ≥ 0 was arbitrary, discounting also holds.
Repeating the argument above for each component functions of g∗
n, with a minor
modiﬁcation for the 2j-th component functions, monotonicity and discounting holds for
θ
j∗
n and ¯ θj∗
n , j = {1,2,...,N}. Thus, proceeding as in the Proof of Lemma 3, T ′ is
shown to be a contraction with the factor of contraction λ, so by the contraction mapping

















˜ B(RN,R2N) such that θ
∗










n is symmetric across
j. From (17) and (18), Γ
j∗
n = ¯ Γj∗
n ≡ Γj∗
n . Moreover, Γj∗




n are continuous and decreasing in x
j
i, so (19) and (20) imply xj∗




n is symmetric across j.
Furthermore, xj∗
n is nondecreasing, as shown below. Clearly xj∗
n is nondecreasing
when it equals −∞, so suppose xj∗
n is ﬁnite. Pick any j, k ∈ {1,2,...,N}, j  = k. Fix
x
−j
















n is symmetric across j, (36) is satisﬁed for x
j
i = xk





i, no other x
j








i, which is continuous
and increasing in xk
i, and is independent of other elements of x
−j
i . Now, with a slight












n (xi) = 0. (37)
Since Γj∗
n (xi) is continuous, decreasing in x
j










uniquely determined, and is continuous and nondecreasing in x
−j




















































n is continuous and nondecreasing in x
−j
i , and is increasing in xk
i ∈ x
−j
i in the region
of x
−j















i. But since xj∗






n,ND = ¯ xj∗
n = ¯ x
j∗
n,ND. Thus, (31) and (32) imply θ
∗












n+1 is symmetric across j, θ
j∗




Finally, let ˜ B′(RN,R2N) denote the space of bounded, continuous, nondecreasing
vector-valued functions g : RN → R2N, g =
￿
g1,g2,...,g2N￿
, where gj is symmet-
ric across j and gj = g2j for j = {1,2,...,N}, equipped with the max-sup norm
||g|| ≡ maxN
j=1(supz∈R |gj (z)|). Further, let ˜ B′′(RN,R2N) ⊆ ˜ B′(RN,R2N) be the space
in which ‘nondecreasing’ in the deﬁnition of ˜ B′(RN,R2N) is replaced by ‘increasing’, and
gj ∈ (0,1) for all j. Then, ˜ B′(RN,R2N) is a closed subset of ˜ B(RN,R2N), and the ar-
gument above implies T
￿ ˜ B′(RN,R2N)
￿
⊆ ˜ B′′(RN,R2N) ⊆ ˜ B(RN,R2N), so it follows that
g∗ ∈ ˜ B′′(RN,R2N) (Stokey and Lucas (1989), Theorem 3.2, Corollary 1). Therefore,
θ
∗ = ¯ θ∗ ≡ θ∗ =
￿
θ1∗,θ2∗,...,θN∗￿
, where θj∗ is symmetric across j, θj∗ ∈ (0,1) and θj∗ is
continuous and increasing. Then, at this ﬁxed point, the expected payoﬀ functions and
the threshold signal functions must be such that Γ
j∗ = ¯ Γj∗ ≡ Γj∗ and xj∗ = ¯ xj∗ ≡ xj∗,





≤ mink =j xk
i also follows





























is the value of x
j
i such that Γj∗(xi) = 0.￿
30Proposition 4
Let us ﬁrst consider the N = 2 case. Among the equations (17)–(22) that deﬁne the
operator T, (17) and (18) are modiﬁed as follows. This time, conditional on receiving
x
j





























































































































































It is straightforward to check that T : ˜ B(R2,R4) → ˜ B(R2,R4) and that monotonicity






n (θ1), ¯ θ1∗
n (θ2), ¯ θ2∗
n (θ1)) ∈ ˜ B(R2,R4). Then ﬁx j ∈ {1,2}, take any a ≥ 0 and
deﬁne g#
n ∈ ˜ B(R2,R4) by replacing the j-th component of g∗
n, namely θ
j∗
n , by θ
j∗
n + a.
Let us denote by Γ
#
n , ¯ Γ#
n , x#
n , ¯ x#
n , θ
#
n+1 and ¯ θ
#
n+1 the functions obtained from g#
n by (41),
(42), and (19)–(22). Then, noting that Γ
j#
n (xi) and Γ
j∗




n (xi) and ¯ Γk∗
n (xi) are nondecreasing in x
j
i for k  = j, xj#
n ≤ xj∗
n + β−1(α + β)a from























































n+1 . Let γj be the maximum value of



























































































where λj ≡ γj/(1 + γj) ∈ (0,1), so θ
j#
n+1 (θ−j) ≤ θ
j##
n+1 (θ−j) ≤ θ
j∗
n+1 (θ−j)+aλj (αj + βj)/βj.

































βj = 1, (44)
and since the choice of a ≥ 0 was arbitrary, discounting also holds. The rest of the proof
follows that of Proposition 1.
For the symmetric N > 2 case, among the equations (17)–(20) and (27)–(32) that
deﬁne the operator T ′, (17) and (18) are modiﬁed as (41) and (42), and cj = c, βj = β in
all equations. It is again straightforward to check that T ′ : ˜ B(RN,R2N) → ˜ B(RN,R2N)





2π. The rest of the proof follows that of Proposition 3.￿
Proposition 5





















































































































































































































Suppose N = 2. Lemma 1 clearly does not hinge on these equations. Lemma 2
follows from the same argument as when noises are independent. Regarding Lemma 3,






























denote the marginal pdf of ǫ
−j























































































































where λj ≡ γj/(1 + γj) ∈ (0,1), which establishes discounting. The remaining part of
the proof follows that of Proposition 1.
For the symmetric N > 2 case, rewrite the equations that deﬁne the operator T ′,
(17)–(20) and (27)–(32), using ϕ. Then discounting can be shown as for the N = 2 case
above, and the rest of the proof follows that of Propositions 2 and 3.￿
33Appendix B: Computational Procedure
For N = 2, the operator T deﬁned by (17)–(22) satisﬁes the requirement of the
contraction mapping theorem, so the equilibrium functions can be obtained by iterating
on these equations from any g∗




0 (θ1), ¯ θ1∗
0 (θ2), ¯ θ2∗
0 (θ1)) ∈ ˜ B(R2,R4).
But then, one can choose g∗
0 such that θ
j∗




0 for j = {1,2}, in which case
g∗




1 (θ1), ¯ θ1∗
1 (θ2), ¯ θ2∗
1 (θ1)) is such that θ
j∗




1 for j = {1,2}, as





































































































for j,k ∈ {1,2}, j  = k, starting from any (θ1∗
0 ,θ2∗
0 ) ∈ ˜ B(R2,R2).22
For the symmetric case, including N = 2, the operator T ′ deﬁned by (17)–(20) and
(27)–(32) satisﬁes the requirement of the contraction mapping theorem, so the equilibrium
functions can be obtained by iterating on these equations from any g∗
0 (θ) ∈ ˜ B(RN,R2N).
However, there are a number of possible simpliﬁcations. As discussed in the proof of
Proposition 3, if g∗
0 (θ) is such that θ
j∗




0 for j = {1,2,...,N}, where θ
j∗
0 is
symmetric across j, then x
j∗








0 , where x
j∗
0 is symmetric across
j; this implies θ
j∗




1 , where θ
j∗
1 is symmetric across j. So, starting from such
g∗
0, the operators T ′ and T are equivalent. Thus, one can iterate on (53)–(55) for a single
j, and set all Γk∗
n to be symmetric to Γj∗









n is symmetric across j, xj∗
n can be expressed as (38). In summary, one can
choose any θ
j∗






































































































































































. So, (19) and (20) simplify as (54).
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Figure 1: Threshold signal function (symmetric, β = 1).




















Figure 2: Attacking decisions (symmetric, β = 1).













Figure 3: Threshold fundamentals function (symmetric, β = 1).












Only country 2 abandons




Figure 4: Outcomes of attack (symmetric, β = 1).
















Figure 5: θ1∗ (θ2) and θ2∗ (θ1) compared with θ∗
s,0.5 (symmetric, β = 1).
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Figure 6: Outcomes of attack (symmetric, β = 4).




















Figure 7: Attacking decisions (β1 = 1, β2 = 4).
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Figure 10: Threshold fundamentals function (N = 3).
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